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In 2006, debates about ‘energy security’ reached the top of the EU’s political agenda. A conjunction of 
political and economic factors seemed to be critically affecting the security of supply in most EU member 
states. A wide range of actors called for the establishment of a ‘Common Energy Policy,’ based on a fully 
operational Internal Energy Market and equipped with an external dimension enabling the EU to speak with 
one voice in the world. The results of this heated debate, however, fell short of these objectives. Informed by 
securitisation approaches, this article explores the debate over energy security that unfolded between 2005 
and 2007.  It aims to provide an understanding about why the framing of energy as a security issue did not 
mobilise enough support in favour of ground-breaking measures to tackle what was unanimously presented 
as a unique and especially hazardous situation. Specifically, the article will argue that those attempts to 
frame energy as a security issue in order to gain support for a Common Energy Policy have been of limited 
effect, precisely because the security framing contributed to the further legitimisation of EU member states’ 




IN THE MID 2000s, A SERIES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD 
energy markets converged, offering an especially disquieting picture. In market terms, the 
already rapidly growing world demand for energy reached an unexpected peak in 2004, with 
a growth rate that doubled the annual average growth rate of the preceding decade (Yergin 
2006: 72). This demand shock was due, in part, to an annual increase of 16 per cent in China’s 
demand of energy, thus supporting the fact that, with the ever-increasing demand from 
developing countries, notably in Asia, energy demand would soon grow faster than supply 
(Grevi 2006: 2). In the geopolitical terrain, the 2000s witnessed how the regions where the 
most important oil and gas reserves are located became particularly unstable.1 Political 
instrumentalisation of energy resources by major producers was also revealed as a great 
concern for European countries. The Russian-Ukrainian natural gas dispute that provoked 
                                                 
1 65% of the world oil reserves are located in Middle Eastern countries from which many terrorist threats 
emanate. The situation in the region was aggravated at the beginning of 2000s due to the war in Iraq and 
the second Intifada in Palestine. Iran’s nuclear programme caused another point of friction in the region. 
Finally, the major hydrocarbons producers in Latin American (Venezuela and Bolivia) suffered from different 
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temporary cuts in supplies in some EU countries in January 2006 caused commotion in many 
European capitals, which until then had seen Russia as a reliable supplier. Unforeseeable 
events, such as natural catastrophes, accidents and terrorist attacks affecting energy 
infrastructure, also demonstrated the vulnerability of the tight global energy markets. For 
example, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, which affected areas of 
high concentration of oil infrastructure in the United States, were depicted as “the world’s 
first integrated energy shock, simultaneously disrupting flows of oil, natural gas, and electric 
power” (Yergin 2006: 70).  For EU representatives, all these trends that had been announced 
over the previous decades – fast growth in global demand of energy, increasing dependence 
on imports from unstable regions, but also rising energy prices and global climate warming – 
suddenly appeared as ‘serious risks’ (Commission/SG/HR for the European Council 2006). 
 
Against this background, between 2005 and 2007 the EU’s political agenda prominently 
featured debates over energy security. All EU institutions and member states put forward 
their proposals for a more integrated energy policy, a ‘Common Energy Policy’ (CEP) in the 
terms used by the Commission (Piebalgs 2006d), or a ‘New Energy Policy’ (NEP) as the 
Council posited (Council of the European Union 2006i, 2006j, 2006k).  Likewise, all institutions 
made a case, in one way or another, for the development of an external dimension of the 
European Energy Policy in order to enhance the external security of energy supplies to the 
EU (Commission of the European Communities/SG/HR for the European Council 2006; 
Commission of the European Communities 2006b).  In this regard, the European Parliament 
even spoke in favour of a ‘Common foreign energy policy strategy’ (European Parliament 
2006b). This was essentially a recognition of the fact that energy supply could not be dealt 
with only within the market sphere, but also needed a strategic, foreign policy approach, 
enabling the EU to maintain a unitary position in international energy relations. The necessity 
of setting new instruments to govern energy at the EU level was also supported by an 
important part of the scientific community (Geden et al. 2006: 25-29; Harks 2006; Westphal 
2006; Baran 2007; Correljé and van der Linde 2006; Mañé-Estrada 2006; Weisser 2007). 
 
Paradoxically, however, this broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy 
policy ran parallel with EU member states’ reinforced trend to affirm their own national 
energy policies. Particularly, big member states continued favouring their large national 
energy companies (national champions), contravening Internal Market rules and provoking 
intergovernmental disputes such as the Spanish-German conflict about the takeover of 
Endesa by E.ON that broke out at the end of 2006. Member states’ bilateral strategies to 
secure their energy supply also caused major intra-EU tensions and mutual accusations of a 
lack of solidarity. Two particularly controversial cases in this regard have been Germany’s 
bilateral agreement with Russia to build a North European Gas Pipeline, now known as ‘Nord 
Stream’ under the Baltic Sea without intermediaries; and Hungary and Italy’s deals with 
Gazprom to build the ‘South Stream’ pipeline to the detriment of the Nabucco pipeline, one 
of the main European projects for diversifying the sources of gas supplies to EU countries.2  
 
This article explores the debate that unfolded between 2005 and 2007 within the EU, as a 
means to help understand this gap between the unparalleled consensus for taking a 
quantum leap forward towards a Common Energy Policy and EU member states’ affirmation 
of their national energy strategies. This article examines what different actors within the EU 
actually mean by energy security and explains why discourses by the European Commission 
and the Parliament about energy were not able to mobilise support in favour of significant, 
ground-breaking measures to tackle the gloomy prospects for energy supply to EU 
countries. The article begins by contextualising the debate over a European Energy Policy, 
                                                 
2 The planned Nord Stream Pipeline will directly connect Vyborg (Russia) with Greifswald (Germany) through 
the Baltic Sea, avoiding the intermediaries of other transit routes from Russia to Germany, i.e. the Jamal 
Europa and Progress pipelines. The project, finally approved in 2005, is promoted by a holding of German 
companies and Gazprom. The Nabucco gas pipeline project is intended to connect the Caspian region via 
Turkey with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria and other Central and Western European countries.  As of 
June 2008, the Gazprom backed competing ‘South Stream’ pipeline is supported by Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Greece and Slovenia.  It is anticipated that Austria will also sign up as a partner.  




arguing that the context of the mid-2000s was particularly propitious for further steps 
towards a Common Energy Policy, both due to international political and economic 
developments and to the securitizing dynamics emerging in the energy domain. The 
sections that follow are dedicated to an analysis of the discourses of the following actors: the 
European Commission (and some Commissioners), the Council of the European Union (as 
well as the contribution of some member states) and the European Parliament. The 
concluding section summarises the debates about the meaning and consequences of the 
various discourses on energy security.  
 
 
Energy Meets Securitization  
 
Energy constituted the starting point of European integration, with the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom treaties adopted in the 1950s. Yet, oddly enough, the 
European Communities had no clear competency in the hydrocarbons sector, although oil 
and gas soon gained a dominant position in the energy mix of most West European 
countries, replacing coal energy.3 The inclusion of the hydrocarbons sector within the 
domain of European integration has long been subject to struggles between member states 
defending their national competencies and monopolies in these strategic sectors and the 
European Commission favouring the establishment of an Internal Energy Market and a 
Common Energy Policy. The oil crisis in 1973 marked the beginning of a slow development 
of a European Energy Policy in the field of hydrocarbons, albeit until the late 1980s, this 
policy would only embrace non-legally binding guidelines and recommendations. The first 
remarkable leap forward in the process of developing a European Energy Policy was 
achieved with the Internal Market reforms introduced following the ‘Single European Act’. 
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU adopted a series of Directives leading to the 
integration of energy markets, most notably regarding the transit of electricity and natural 
gas through the major European networks, as well as the transparency of gas and electricity 
prices.4 The reforms introduced at the beginning of 2000 allowed for the further liberalization 
of the electricity and gas sectors in the EU member states. Throughout this period, the scope 
of the nascent European Energy Policy sector progressively enlarged to embrace 
environmental concerns, placing an emphasis on renewable energies and energy efficiency.  
 
These progresses notwithstanding, there are still numerous issues that remain outside the 
scope of European integration.5 Indeed, as early as 1990, the European Commission had 
already proposed the inclusion of an entire chapter in the Treaty of the European Union on a 
‘Common Energy Policy,’ pursuing the following objectives: security of supply in the EU; the 
stability of the energy market; progress towards the internal energy market; adoption of 
measures to be taken for all energy sources in the event of a crisis; and a high degree of 
environmental protection (Matláry 1997: 62). This inclusion was rejected by the member 
states and nowadays, it is still not possible to talk about a Common Energy Policy, much less 
                                                 
3 Coal constituted a basic source of total energy consumption in member states of the European 
Communities, but was substituted progressively by oil and gas. In 1950, coal provided 70 per cent of energy 
for consumption and oil 12 per cent, lignite 8 per cent, and primary electricity 8 per cent, In 1971, this 
situation had changed significantly with oil constituted 60 per cent of energy consumption, coal 20 per cent, 
gas 11 per cent, lignite 4 per cent and primary electricity 5 per cent. It is worth noting that despite initial 
expectations, nuclear power developed very slowly as a source of energy and in 1970, contributed only 1 per 
cent of energy consumption (Commission of the European Communities 1972: 3-4). In 2005, the Gross Inland 
Consumption of energy was made up of 17 per cent solid fuels, 36 per cent oil, 24 per cent natural gas, 14 
per cent nuclear power, and renewable energy provided almost 7 per cent of energy (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport 2008: 96). 
4 The Directives related to the transit of electricity and gas through the major European networks established 
that transit conditions negotiated between operators responsible for major networks and relevant bodies in 
member states should be non-discriminatory and impartial and must not contain unfair clauses and 
unjustified restrictions. The Directive on the transparency of gas and electricity prices for industrial end-users 
made compulsory the communication of prices data twice a year (Moussis 2004: 334). 
5 The European Commission, despite its insistence during the 1990s, failed to introduce the carbon tax as an 
element of energy policy (Matláry 1997: 68-71). 




consider an external dimension of the European Energy Policy, despite some small 
developments that will be discussed later in this article.  
 
It has been argued that progress in developing both internal as well as external dimensions 
of the European Energy Policy was achieved mainly due to the ‘windows of opportunity’ 
brought about by external events (see Matláry 1997; Moussis 2004).  The context of the mid 
2000s, it was speculated, could work as another such window of opportunity. In fact, in 2006, 
alarm vis-à-vis changes in the world energy system appeared clearer than ever before and 
the concept of ‘energy security’ became one of the core elements of the energy debate. The 
words of the Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, show the dominance of this new 
framing:  
 
…over the past year we have seen the issue of security of energy supply become the issue of 
international relations. Across Europe, there has been a change in sentiment. Whereas 
previously the issue of security of supply was a technical issue reserved for the very specialised 
engineer or system operator, now the issue of energy security is on the table of every energy 
minister, as well as foreign, finance and industry ministers across Europe (Piebalgs 2006e) 
[Emphases added]. 
 
From the perspective of securitisation studies, speaking of security is a non negligible act. 
This is because presenting a public issue as a serious security threat means elevating this 
issue to an absolute priority, so that the logical consequence will be to take emergency 
measures or an exceptional course of action to face it (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver et al. 1993). 
Employing security discursively is considered a politically-laden act also because it involves 
defining what legitimately deserves protection. Accordingly, basic concepts of securitisation 
approaches include securitising moves and referent objects. Securitising moves arise when a 
discourse takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat. These moves can 
lead to successful securitisation only if the relevant audience agrees with the given security 
discourse and its policy consequences. For security discourses to be accepted, it is essential 
that the audience attributes a high value to the issues identified as being threatened (the 
referent objects). However, it might also help that the threat-defence logic of the security 
discourse appears reasonable and the proposed measures workable. That is to say, the chain 
linking the causes and the consequences should be traceable and the proposed measures 
should convincingly appear capable of tackling the identified sources of threat. 
 
The unprecedented debate about energy security in the EU together with the overall meagre 
outcomes of it opens many questions in this regard. Why did securitizing moves by different 
institutional actors not successfully activate the extraordinary measures to be expected from 
successful securitizations? What did different actors really mean when speaking about 
energy security? Were all speakers referring to the same threats and referent objects? Which 
actors employed a more securitizing rhetoric and for what purpose? Energy is a particularly 
elusive policy domain, since it can theoretically be framed in almost all the sectors identified 
in securitization studies (military, political, economic, societal and environmental). For 
example, a lack of energy resources can be conceived as a factor increasing the likelihood of 
military conflicts; as critically affecting economic performance; or certain inefficient uses of 
energy might be considered harmful for the environment. Similarly, referent objects might be 
placed over different levels, ranging from the individual (e.g. consumers) to the systemic level 
(e.g. global energy markets). In between, other intermediate levels of analysis are also 
possible in the case of energy security, for example the unit (e.g. national energy systems) or 
the level of the sub-system (e.g. EU internal market). The article endeavours to identify 
precisely which sectors of perceived threats and levels of referent objects actors were 
referring to and to analyse whether different definitions imply support for different measures 
to tackle the identified threats.  
 
Securitization studies that have addressed European integration have mostly concluded that 
some of the decisive steps towards new areas of integration have been facilitated by 
successful securitizing moves. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in particular, is a 
place where new security framings have been, for good or for bad, an important trigger for 




EU integrationist developments; for example, in migration and asylum policies (Huysmans 
2000, 2006; Bigo and Guild 2005) or in police, justice and intelligence cooperation (Balzacq 
2008; Bigo 1996; De Goede 2008; Guild 2008). Also in the foreign policy domain, some studies 
have argued that securitization mechanisms have contributed to some important policy 
developments; for example, EU eastern enlargement (Higashino 2004) or the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Jeandesboz 2006). Hence, the question emerges of whether 
securitizing moves in energy policy, although not completely successful, did also contribute 
in one way or another to further integration in this domain. Such steps would crucially 
include the completion of deregulation and liberalisation of energy markets in member 
states; the establishment of new organs at the EU level to deal with energy such as EU 
regulatory agencies; or the setting up of an external dimension of a Common Energy Policy 
or at least well-built coordination mechanisms amongst EU member states, enabling them to 
elaborate common positions in international energy relations. 
 
 
European Commission Discourses on Energy 
 
Since the oil crisis of 1974, the European Commission has been advancing the notion of 
‘energy security’ (Commission of the European Communities 1974). However, the 
Commission’s approach to this topic was then circumscribed to economic and technocratic 
measures for harmonizing national energy policies. Conversely, the Commission’s recent 
documents about the European Union’s energy policy in general and its external dimension 
in particular (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 2006b, 2007)6 have been 
characterized by a high securitising tone.  
 
The basic sources of threat identified by the Commission are related to well known concerns 
about energy supply and dysfunctions in global energy markets: the growing dependency 
on energy imports and the concentration of reserves in only a few countries and regions, 
most of them unstable; the growing global demand for energy; the lack of reliable, 
affordable and sustainable flows of energy; and low reliability of suppliers, which may use 
energy as a political lever. In a nutshell, the Commission defined as threatening the fact that 
external actors do not ‘play the same game’ as the EU, thus reinforcing perceptions of 
instability. These observations were further aggravated by other uncertainties surrounding 
energy, such as the perspectives for global demand, price volatility, and the actual capacity 
of producer countries to supply the energy demanded due to the lack of necessary 
investments. In this context, divergences between member states, for example regarding 
policies towards Russia, and the lack of intra-EU solidarity in the event of a crisis were also 
considered a challenge for particular member states or the EU in general due to the fact that 
some countries are completely dependent on one source of energy supplies. All these 
energy-related threats are mainly of a market-economic nature, but may have consequences 
in broader terms: geopolitical security, economic stability, social development and climate 
change. 
 
With all the aforementioned developments in mind, Commissioner Piebalgs (2006b) went so 
far as to declare that the world has entered into a “new energy era” that will last for the next 
few decades. This provoked a call for an urgent change in dealing with energy: “we are facing 
a period in which we have to get serious about the energy transition we are facing. We can 
either prepare it sensibly today, or risk being faced with a major crisis to our energy system 
                                                 
6 The last significant document of the European Commission, before the fresh re-emergence of the energy 
debate, was issued in 2000 under the title ‘Green Paper − Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply’ (Commission of the European Communities 2000). This document ‘opened up a debate on 
energy policy unprecedented in the last 30 years’ and encouraged the Commission to put forward some 
proposals concerning the regulation of energy efficiency, energy savings in buildings and fiscal and 
regulatory proposals to promote biofuels. However, the conclusion that “one message of the debate is to 
reflect on a global concept of security of supply” and for the European Union “is necessary to reinforce the 
co-ordination of the measures ensuring security of supply” was not followed in practice until the recent 
debate (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 9). 




for want of sufficient preparation” (Piebalgs 2006a).  But on the other hand, the ‘novelty’ of 
the situation led him to elaborate on the lack of predictability in the energy sector, which is 
regarded as a source of political concern in itself. He argues for example that “global oil 
markets are not characterised by transparency and, put quite simply, we do not know how 
long oil will last, but we do know that the clock is ticking” (Piebalgs 2006c). Moreover, this 
uncertainty could be further aggravated by natural disasters or other accidents having a 
negative impact on energy, especially on prices and accessibility. The inability to make a 
rational and planned forecast of the energy situation through known free-market 
mechanisms exacerbates this perception of insecurity. But at the same time, this uncertainty 
discourse obscures the cause-effect relationship between the origin of threats and objects 
affected.  
 
The definition of the referent objects in the documents presented by the Commission are 
somewhat diffuse, but focused at the sub-system level: the referent objects cover the 
European Union as a part of the world market; the competitiveness of the EU economies as a 
condition for consumers’ (both individuals and businesses) well-being; and finally, the 
process of European integration itself, especially in its economic and international aspects. 
For example, the Communication, ‘An Energy for Europe’, from January 2007 recalls the 
origins of European integration in the Messina Declaration and stresses that “energy is 
essential for Europe to function” (Commission of the European Communities 2007). This 
discourse is complemented by a more global perspective, which acknowledges that the 
energy problem is not exclusively European, since “energy interdependence is becoming a 
global issue, with major shared concerns” (Piebalgs 2006a). But overall one may conclude 
that the need to protect EU competitiveness (and thus, European integration itself) was the 
dominant framing.  
 
The discourses of other Commissioners clearly show a relationship with their institutional 
responsibilities. The discourse of Stavros Dimas, the Commissioner responsible for 
environmental policy, is structured around the threat of the consequences of climate change 
which may affect, especially in environmental and social terms, not only Europe but also the 
global level. For his referent object (environment, broadly considered), energy (or better, the 
misuse of energy) is considered a source of threat that should be faced ‘urgently’, ‘decisively’ 
and ‘quickly’ (Dimas 2005, 2006a, 2006b). In turn, Nelie Kroes, the Commissioner responsible 
for competition policy, focuses on a market and economy approach. The threats coming 
from outside the European Union are possible shortages of supply and trends observed in 
the global energy market. However, Kroes emphasises the problems related with the 
development of the Internal Energy Market. In this regard, a threat to EU competitiveness is 
market concentration, which leads to a lack of investment in infrastructure, a lack of 
consumer choice, lack of interconnections and thus, non-market regulated prices for energy 
(Kroes 2006a, 2006b). 
 
Consistent with the Commission and various Commissioners’ identification of the referent 
object at the level of the EU, the proposed measures are also EU-wide and go in the direction 
of greater integration in the energy field. Crucially, some of the measures proposed to 
alleviate the weaknesses of the European Energy Policy implied Member States’ pooling of 
sovereignty in sensible issues such as energy infrastructure or the energy mix. Regarding 
infrastructure, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Energy Regulator 
that would have decision making powers to establish common rules and approaches such as 
a European grid code to facilitate cross-border trade in electricity and gas7 (Commission of 
the European Communities 2006a: 6). Furthermore, in reference to the energy mix, the 
Commission indirectly suggested the limitation of Member States’ sovereignty in choosing 
                                                 
7 As an alternative to the European Energy Regulator, the Commission proposed the establishment of a 
European Centre for Energy Networks, thus formalizing intergovernmental cooperation between national 
transmission system operators. Other institutional proposals of the Commission were the establishment of 
the Energy Correspondents’ Network and the European Energy Supply Observatory. The first one would 
reinforce the cooperation between member states in cases of crises, since the later would monitor the 
energy markets. 




their own energy mix when proposing the establishment of ‘a minimum level of the overall 
EU energy mix originating from secure and low-carbon energy sources’ (Commission for the 
European Communities 2006a: 9). Other internal measures proposed by the Commission to 
increase security of supply were of a more conventional nature: further development of an 
Internal Energy Market through liberalizing and regulative measures, energy savings, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy and further research into energy technology.  
 
The measures that the EU should undertake in its external energy policy also contain 
proposals pushing for further integration, although their scope and institutional linkage 
within the EU system remains ambiguous. The most far-reaching example is the decision of 
appointing European coordinators “to represent EU interest in key international projects” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007: 19) in accordance with trans-European 
network guidelines approved in 2006 (Decision No. 1364/2006/EC). Another proposed 
mechanism for coordinating Member States’ external energy policies, was the creation of the 
network of energy correspondents “to assist the EU’s early response and reactions in case of 
energy security threats” (Commission of the European Communities 2006b: 6). The 
Commission also stressed the relevance of the principle of coherence in EU energy policy 
between different EU energy-related policies and between the EU and Member States, 
especially with reference to issues of sustainability and climate change. Diversification of 
energy supplies in terms of energy sources, geographical origin and transit routes also 
ranked high in the Commission’s documents. Other methods proposed for increasing the 
security of supply include the establishment of dialogue and energy partnerships with 
producing, transitional and other consuming countries, the creation of a pan-European 
Energy Community, that is to say the extension of the European energy acquis communautaire 
to neighbouring countries with the main aim of “ensuring stable and predictable regulatory 
frameworks for [the] development of energy markets and for providing stable conditions for 
the necessary investment in the supply of hydrocarbons” (Piebalgs 2006f). These are 
however measures that were already in place before the beginning of the ‘energy security’ 
debate in late 2005.8  
 
At the level of international energy markets, the European Commission focused on 
describing how this area should be organized world-wide, establishing “a new energy 
system, based on effective collaboration between producers and consumers, efforts to 
increase energy efficiency worldwide and a quantum leap in the production of renewable 
and low carbon energy” (Piebalgs 2006g). Measures proposed are somewhat diffuse, but 
some examples include the promotion of an international agreement on energy efficiency or 
widening the geographic scope of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006b). 
 
All in all, the content of the measures proposed by the European Commission were not much 
different from earlier proposals or instruments already in place. However, they were 
presented in the new light of the threats and risks emerging from the changed situation of 
the energy markets. Therefore, security discourse seems to be more inclined towards giving 
political salience and a sense of urgency to the already known measures and convincing the 
target audience (member states) to effectively implement them. In the same vein, the 
discourse about the novel and insecure world energy system served as a background for the 
Commission to justify the need for new landmark decisions paving the way for a Common 




                                                 
8 The Energy Community process, aimed at extending the EU’s internal energy market to the South East 
European region, was initiated in 2002 and the Treaty was signed in October 2005. The proposal of its 
extension to other countries, e.g. Ukraine, was already considered in 2004. Although to a very different 
extent, the Energy Charter Treaty signed in 1994 − joining 51 states from the Eurasian space plus the 
European Communities − is also aimed at establishing a legal foundation for energy security, based on the 
principles of open, competitive markets and sustainable development. 




European Parliament Discourses on Energy 
 
The European Parliament (EP) has also been very active in the debate on energy security 
since the early 1970s, by issuing various reports and resolutions on the topic.  Individual 
MEPs and groups have also contributed to debates on energy policy issues through 
parliamentary questions. Since the Parliament became a directly elected body in 1979, about 
250 parliamentary questions on energy policy have been posed to the Council or the 
Commission (42 of them directly related to the issue of energy supply).9  During 2006, two 
main resolutions on this specific topic were discussed and adopted by the European 
Parliament (European Parliament 2006a, 2006b). In both documents, the EP made clear the 
connection between energy and security in global and European terms and clearly spoke in 
favour of a Common Energy Policy. Compared to the Commission’s documents, the 
Parliament’s discourse was even more straight-forward in describing the sources of threat 
and their proposals more far-reaching in their integrationist content.  
 
Regarding the sources of threat, the EP noted with considerable concern the EU’s high level 
of energy-import dependency on a limited number of energy producers and supply routes, a 
situation that, in its view, poses a “serious risk to its stability and prosperity” (European 
Parliament 2006b). The EP expressed its concern about the political use of energy supplies 
and prices, aggravated by Russian disputes over energy prices with its neighbours, and talks 
of the possible establishment of ‘gas OPEC’, which would have a major medium- and long-
term impact on gas prices and security of supply. In this situation, the EP developed an 
emergency discourse “urging the Commission and the member states to take very seriously 
the real danger of a deficit in gas supplies from Russia after 2010” which, in its view, would be 
brought on, among other things, by a lack of investment, excessive leakage and energy 
waste in the Russian domestic market (European Parliament 2006b). At the same time, 
observing the well known problem of the lack of competitiveness in the EU energy market, 
the EP blamed member states for their “protectionist support for national market leaders” 
that distorts the internal market (European Parliament 2006a). 
 
Regarding the referent object, the documents of the Parliament stress the social dimension 
of energy policy, indicating that “rising energy prices not only affect the economy as a whole 
but, above all, the socially disadvantaged” and claim that “consumers must be placed at the 
centre of all future energy policies” (European Parliament 2006b). The EP’s discourse is 
couched in terms of a holistic vision of the consequences of the disturbance to energy 
supply.  This is evident, for example, in its statement that “energy security should be 
considered an essential component of the global security concept and has an increasing 
impact on the overall security of the European Union” (European Parliament 2006a). It also 
observes that “disturbances in the supply of energy may create instability and can endanger 
peace” and that “…precarious energy and climate security situation is frequently the trigger 
for international crises and conflicts, which have consequences for democracy, human rights 
and poverty” (European Parliament 2006b). 
 
The Parliament’s proposed measures were characterised by a high degree of specificity, 
especially regarding the global and EU external levels, with some proposals going even 
further than those of the Commission. Although political groups and individual MEPs 
maintained diverse positions on the topic during parliamentary debates, the positions 
expressed in the two resolutions analysed here contain a clear push for a Common Energy 
Policy, including what the Parliament calls a ‘common foreign energy security strategy’ 
(European Parliament 2006b). In fact, in its resolutions, the EP regretted that the 
Commission’s “Green Paper does not propose new targets or advance concrete proposals 
that would respond to recent calls for a common energy policy” (European Parliament 
2006a).  
 
                                                 
9 The data come from EurLex (Term search of Eurovoc descriptor: energy policy and energy supply). 




At the level of the international energy system, the EP proposed three kinds of measures. The 
first, in line with the Commission, was the promotion of a dialogue between consumers and 
producers in order to define a global approach and strategies towards energy. But compared 
to the discourse of the Commission, the Parliament seems to adopt a more confrontational 
stance in that it calls for the joining of efforts from consuming countries to counterbalance 
the oligopoly on the production side (European Parliament 2006b).10 Secondly, the EP 
proposed more concrete measures to “promote rules and institutions at a global level in 
order to protect sources of energy as well as the well-functioning of energy markets”. For 
example, concrete measures to promote energy efficiency at a global scale could include the 
setting of minimum efficiency standards for global goods such as cars, appliances, consumer 
electronics and office equipment, to be harmonised in phases, and the promotion, at a 
global level, of integration of environmental issues into transport and energy decisions 
(European Parliament 2006a). The EP also proposed the creation of an internationally 
recognised mediation system for cases of conflict and dispute concerning the delivery and 
distribution of energy, for example in the framework of the WTO; in concrete terms, the EP 
put forward a proposal for the EU to pioneer this mediation system by developing it first 
within the framework of its Neighbourhood Policy and also with other key supplier countries 
and then to promote it at a global level (European Parliament 2006a). Finally, the EP also 
proposed linking energy security to development policies, recalling the right of every person 
in the world to have access to basic energy services, as stated in the Millennium 
Development Goals. Measures to achieve such development goals regarding energy would 
include the incorporation of a greater number of programmes promoting clean and efficient 
energy in the EU’s development policy. Concrete measures included for example the formal 
endorsement by the Commission of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and 
the development of a strategy to mainstream the principles of the EITI and the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Scheme into all agreements with third countries.  
 
Regarding the EU’s external measures for the protection of the EU’s interests on the world 
stage, the EP insisted on the need to ‘speak with one voice’ to increase its leverage in 
negotiations with energy producing and consuming countries. Remarkably, the EP even 
proposed that the Commissioner for energy policy be put in charge of this task, with a clearly 
defined mandate, which could set out a long-term European energy planning vision 
(European Parliament 2006b).  In the EP’s view, the ‘supreme aim’ of this external energy 
policy should be a reduction of the EU’s dependence on fossil fuels from a few large 
suppliers and the diversification of the sources of energy and transit routes. The EP also 
encouraged cooperation with other producer (Central Asia) and transit countries but 
specifically underlined its concerns about Russia and its reluctance to accept the rules 
stipulated in the Transit Protocol and the Energy Charter Treaty “ensuring future much-
needed foreign investment in Russia's energy infrastructure and ensuring an adequate gas 
supply to the EU in the future” (European Parliament 2006b). Furthermore, the EP proposed 
in more detail the principles and objectives of energy relations in a future agreement 
between the EU and Russia.11  Like the Commission, the EP indicated the relevance of the 
ENP and its mechanisms as well as the extension of the Energy Community Treaty to other 
countries.12 However, in the view of the EP, cooperation with producer and transit countries 
                                                 
10 In the resolution of December 2006, however, the EP also stated that producer countries also needed to be 
engaged in this definition of a global approach to energy. The principles of these new forms of global energy 
dialogue should aim at making global energy markets stable, secure and transparent, and at the same time provide 
a continued boost in favour of clean energy sources and energy efficiency (European Parliament 2006b). 
11 These are: the incorporation of WTO mechanisms for settlement of disputes between the EU and Russia and/or 
individual investors; mutual access to infrastructure; competition rules limiting the power of quasi-monopolistic 
companies which have not been unbundled having access to their respective energy markets; and an agreement 
to address the issue of technical failures in the third countries affecting cross-border supplies to a EU Member 
State. 
12 During the parliamentary debates, the MEP Charles Tannock, rapporteur of one of the main reports on the ENP in 
2006, spoke in favour of including Kazakhstan in the ENP, based on energy security considerations: “I have 
repeatedly made a case for a stable Kazakhstan to join the ENP, as (…) could indeed supply not just oil and gas but 
also uranium to the European Union, as we will inevitably have to build more nuclear reactors to satisfy Kyoto and 
not be over-reliant on unstable regions of the world –such as the Middle East, Venezuela or Nigeria, to name but a 
few – for fossil fuels” (European Parliament 2006c). 




should also encompass policies promoting “democratic reforms, the development of civil 
society and social progress”, which “will contribute substantially to long-term political 
stability, which is necessary for security in the supply and distribution of energy” (European 
Parliament 2006a).  As to the Internal Market, the Parliament’s proposals followed the 
Commission’s line. The EP emphasised the need for member states to implement existing 
Internal Market provisions to avoid the formation of oligopolistic energy markets or market 
dominance.  It also called on the member states to agree on concrete, measurable objectives 
on issues such as the development of renewable energies, energy efficiency or Kyoto-related 
commitments. Yet, criticisms were directed at the Commission for the lack of instruments 
provided to address the high level of oil dependency in the transport and aviation sectors 
which were identified as the main cause of Europe's biggest security of supply problems and 
also environmental damage.  
 
Overall, during the three plenary debates about energy security that took place in 2006, 
several MEPs defended the urgency of adopting further integrative measures in the energy 
domain employing a high securitizing tone. However, a contradiction seemed to appear in 
the very definition of energy and the measures proposed, particularly in the external 
dimension of this policy. As mentioned above, the EP proposed far-reaching integrationist 
steps in the external energy policy, proposing a leading role for the Commissioner for Energy 
in international energy relations. Yet, during the debates, some of the MEPs that most 
maintained that energy had to be dealt with as a security issue, ended up with the 
conclusion that it should be regarded as a matter of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and not so much as a Community policy issue.  The following quote by Polish MEP, 
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, exemplifies the difficulty of framing energy as a security issue without 
taking it out of the Community domain:  
 
The problem should therefore be considered as a foreign and security policy issue and so, 
besides Commissioner Piebalgs, I would willingly address Mr Solana and Mrs Ferrero-Waldner. 
It is essential for the EU to develop a true external security policy dimension in relation to gas 
and oil deliveries, which is distinct from energy policies sensu stricto. We should not mix them 
up [emphases added] (European Parliament 2006c). 
 
 
Member States’ Discourses on Energy 
 
The issue of energy security has only very recently been incorporated as a relevant matter on 
the Council’s agenda. The intergovernmental debate on energy policy was encouraged by 
the informal meeting of Heads of State and Governments, held in Hampton Court in October 
2005, which marked the turning point in the intergovernmental debate about energy. At that 
meeting, energy security ranked high on the list of topics to reflect on the future path of 
European integration, and EU member states started to think about some kind of ‘New 
European Energy Policy’. The already mentioned dispute over the prices of gas delivered 
from Russia to Ukraine and the ensuing Russian gas cut-off at the beginning of 2006, which 
affected not only Ukraine but also various member states of the EU, acted as catalysts for 
discussion in various configurations of the Council.  
 
Some member states in particular acted as catalysts for this debate on energy security, by 
emphasising the geopolitical dimension of energy policy. For example, German 
representatives, in contrast to their country’s traditional economic approach to energy 
issues, repeatedly spoke about energy as a serious geopolitical security challenge and called 
for the development a ‘foreign energy policy’ as a new policy category (Steinmeier 2006a; 
2006b, 2006c).13 The main source of threat was the coupling of rising global demand of 
energy with the fact that the most energy resources are located in regions of the world 
                                                 
13 It is relevant that the “White Book for Security Policy of Germany and the future of the Bundeswehr” of 2006 
included ‘Energy security’ as a section in its own. It established that “for the future of Germany and Europe, a 
sustainable and competitive energy supply is of strategic importance” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 
2006: 17) 




characterised by political instability.14 The German foreign minister insisted on the need to 
find energy security means not only for EU countries but also for all producing, transit and 
consumer countries, especially on the European continent and its neighbourhood. “Regional 
cooperation”, according to the German foreign minister, would include the North Sea, 
Northern Africa, Russia and the Gulf States (Steinmeier 2006a). By contrast, other member 
states, mainly from central Europe, insisted on the need to reinforce solidarity among 
European countries and reduce dependency on countries such as Russia, which exerted 
political pressure through the use of energy instruments. Poland was the standard-bearer of 
this discourse, especially after the approval of the North Stream gas pipeline under the Baltic 
Sea in September 2005, perceived as being directed against some member states’ security of 
supply.15 However, in both cases, the referent objects were states’ energy independence and 
their autonomy in vital economic and political matters. In no case did states propose a 
pooling of sovereignty or transfer of competencies to the EU level as a suitable option to 
alleviate the risks of external dependency, but rather, they favoured other forms of 
intergovernmental cooperation outside the EU framework. 
 
Some of these forms of extra-EU intergovernmental cooperation are highlighted in the 
proposals for an ‘energy NATO’ and its rival ‘energy OSCE’, advanced by Poland and Germany 
respectively. The first was advanced by Poland in March 2006 and consisted of a ‘European 
Energy Security Treaty’, aimed at developing an absolutely new kind of political instrument 
linking states in the area by mutual energy security guarantees. The core of the Polish ‘NATO 
energy’ proposal would be a commitment “to cooperate in bringing assistance to a Party 
affected by restrictions in energy supplies, and to build and develop the necessary 
organisational and technical infrastructure designed to permit such cooperation”. More 
specifically, the Energy Treaty would have a clause of mutual assistance among the Treaty 
signatories, as in the case of NATO, whereby “a threat to the energy security of one…will be a 
threat to the energy security of all…”. In order to secure energy supply, the proposal also 
established the objective of diversification of energy sources and transit routes (Council of 
the European Union, 2006l). Quite to the contrary, Germany (Steinmeier 2006b) referred to 
regional cooperation on energy in the form of some kind of “energy OSCE”, claiming that 
cooperative security strategy ”can rely on the success of the Helsinki process”. In this sense, 
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier stressed that there is no need for totally new 
instruments since “more importantly we have to revitalise the already existing forms of 
cooperation in energy policy context in the light of new challenges” (Steinmeier 2006b). Both 
of these proposals failed to be implemented but the residual outcome of Polish insistence on 
energy solidarity was the inclusion of this concept in the Lisbon Treaty, although the 
solidarity obligations were watered down in comparison to Poland’s initial proposals.16  
 
Other countries, such as France or Great Britain, were more cautious in presenting proposals 
on external measures for security of supply. For example, for France, in its ‘Memorandum for 
revitalising European energy policy with a view to sustainable development’ of January 2006, 
security of supply appeared to be more related to issues such as electricity interconnections, 
internal diversification of the energy mix, increased energy efficiency and use of renewable 
energies. Indeed, the Council debates for an ‘Energy Policy for Europe’ were framed more in 
terms of this internal dimension.  As established by the Council, the means to develop a 
European Energy Policy were “investment, technological development, domestic and foreign 
trade, environment policy [...] employment, regional policy and particularly transport policy” 
                                                 
14The danger of these global dynamics was plainly formulated in expressions such as “global hunger for 
resources” and “world order politics threaten to collide” (Steinmeier 2006b). 
15 In January 2006, Poland presented a joint position on the diversification of energy supplies to Central and 
East European countries, prepared together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Austrian EU 
Presidency, and also promoted a joint action plan (worked out with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania) to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas (Documents referred 
to in Geder et al. 2006: 20) 
16 Art. 100 of the Treaty introduced the concept of “solidarity”, stating that “without prejudice to any other 
procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a 
spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in 
particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy”. 




and only in the last position “foreign and development policy” (Council of the European 
Union 2006m). 
 
However, what unites the discourses of all the member states is the emphasis on their 
competencies in determining their national strategies for security of supply. For example, 
Portugal insisted that the principle of subsidiarity “dictates that member states should keep 
the right to decide on the most appropriate solutions for implementing energy policies and 
measures, in order to take account of their specific situations” (Council of the European 
Union 2006d).  Germany also stressed that “while a legal framework will be set at [the] EU 
level taking the subsidiarity principle into account, the choice of energy mix and general 
structure of energy supply as well as compliance with the legal framework will remain a 
matter of the Member States” (Council of the European Union 2006e). In the same vein, Spain 
stated that “improving the dependence-vulnerability relationship is the primary aim of 
Community action” while emphasizing the prerequisite of “preserving national sovereignty 
over energy sources and safeguard national preferences for the choice of energy-mix […] for 
it to be otherwise would be a grave mistake” (Council of the European Union 2006h). In the 
French proposals, it might seem that European and member states’ levels are blurred, but for 
France the origin of a European Energy Policy stems from the exchange of national energy 
plans. With this aim in mind, each member state should “identify the medium and long-term 
balance to be achieved between supply (production plus imports) and demand, and 
contribute to the drafting of national energy policies in which each Member State establishes 
a clear framework for the actions it aims to take to balance supply and demand” (Council of 
the European Union 2006b). 
 
Contributions arguing for a Community-focused dimension of energy policy are in a clear 
minority. For example, the main concern for Italy was the lack of an adequate legal basis for 
more integrated policies, which would make energy a matter of shared competence between 
the Commission and the member states (Council of the European Union 2006c). In this 
respect, Belgium also insisted that “the time has come to boost Europe’s influence in so 
strategic an area as Energy” and that “the pursuit of a European energy policy demands that 
Europe be able to speak with a single voice and brings its full economic political weight to 
bear in dialogue with third countries, both producer countries and consumer countries” 
(Council of the European Union 2006f). 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that the Council’s proposals for the EU’s external energy 
relations underline the responsibility of member states, as shown in the various drafts of the 
document ‘A New Energy Policy for Europe’, where the ministers ”call for a reinvigorated 
Energy policy for Europe, aiming at coherence between member states”, their “sovereignty 
over primary energy source” and respect for “member states preferences for the choice of 
energy mix”; ensuring an utmost degree of consistency at the Community level “they should 
take due account of member states specific characteristics” (Council of the European Union 
2006i) or “recalling the primary responsibility of member states in the event of supply crisis” 
(Council of the European Union 2006j). 
 
Consequently, the conclusions of the Council meetings focused on the EU’s internal and 
external measures on security of supply policy with much more ambiguity and vagueness 
than the other Community institutions. The initial debate within the Council confirmed the 
extreme caution in adopting any far-reaching decision. The Austrian Presidency in early 2006 
maintained a prudent stance and hardly raised any new topics to be debated or 
extraordinary measures to be implemented (Council of the European Union 2006a). 
Therefore, it is comprehensible that after taking the opinion of other member states into 
consideration, the Presidency recognised that: 
 
[…] regarding the regulatory framework it is worth noting that there are very few requests or 
suggestions for the development of new instruments, with the possible exception of measures 
related to energy efficiency and gas storage, while several delegations, […], are pressing for a 
fuller implementation of the existing framework and, to that effect, more consistency in the 
remit of regulators throughout Europe (Council of the European Union 2006g). 





However, despite the initial reluctance of many member states to approve concrete 
proposals, especially when it came to establishing new institutional forms of cooperation, 
some ideas were finally adopted by the European Council in March 2007. European leaders 
agreed to base the European Energy Policy on internal measures such as the reinforcement 
and full implementation of the Internal Energy Market.  They also agreed on the objective of 
20 per cent of the overall energy mix in 2020 to be from renewable energy sources and 
stressed the relevance of energy efficiency in order to reduce primary energy consumption 
in 2020 by 20 per cent. Taking into account the indeterminacy of earlier proposals by the 
Council, the agreement on establishing concrete targets represents a significant political 
commitment. However, the Council dismissed the more ambitious and integrationist 
proposals from the Commission, such as establishing an EU regulatory agency to deal with 
energy policy. 
 
As far as the external dimension of energy policy is concerned, no major proposals were 
adopted. The most remarkable, albeit timid, decisions of the European Council of March 
2007 had to do with security of supply. It was agreed to establish more effective crisis 
response mechanisms to face the eventuality of a crisis in supply. However, the significance 
of these mechanisms is far from clear, given the carefully worded compromise that further 
mechanisms should be built “notably on existing mechanisms [...] taking into account the 
primary responsibility of Member States regarding their domestic demand” (Council of the 
European Union 2007: 18). The Council also approved the institutionalisation of the role of 
the network of energy security correspondents which had met informally for the first time 
after the Ukrainian-Russian energy crisis of January 2006. Likewise, the Commission’s 
proposal of establishing an Energy Observatory within the Commission was adopted 
(Council of the European Union 2007: 18). Finally, the Council agreed that energy be 
included on the agenda of the EU’s bilateral and regional external relationships. 
 
In summary, the Council’s proposals fail to reflect the positions adopted both by the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, particularly on the question of whether 
the EU is the most appropriate level to tackle energy related problems. Ironically, member 
states actually shared the views of both the Commission and the EP concerning the 
evolution of energy as a vital security concern. However, this security framing of energy is 
precisely what justified their reluctance to (1) transfer competencies to the supranational 
level and (2) increase the level of intergovernmental cooperation within the EU on these 
issues. Therefore, the member states’ collective approach to a European Energy Policy was to 
continue “to do the same but better” and to achieve greater coherence through “better 
exploiting the synergies and complementarities between the various, internal and external, 





This article has discussed the various discourses of the EU institutions and those member 
states that took an active role in the debate on energy security in order to understand why 
the final results of this debate failed to reflect the high securitizing rhetoric maintained by 
most of the actors involved. In this regard, we have argued that few significant measures 
were finally adopted towards a Common Energy Policy, although several proposals were put 
forward in this direction. Particularly, the Commission and the EP advanced proposals that, 
even though they were not entirely new, did envisage an important step towards further 
communitarisation of energy policy. Conversely, the novel decisions finally adopted by the 
Council mostly consisted of loose mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation that 
would draw on already existing instruments. 
 
Informed by securitization studies, this article has attempted to explain the reasons for this 
gap between highly securitizing discourse on the one hand, and, on the other, the lack of 
agreement on taking urgency or extraordinary measures to tackle the identified sources of 
insecurity. In the first place, we argued that differences in actors’ approaches to energy 




security did not have to do with the definitions of the threats, which were similar in all 
discourses, but with their differing referent objects. Regarding the definitions of threats and 
risks, our analysis has shown that there was significant similarity between the different actors 
in terms of the way they were framing energy. The dominant discourse maintained that the 
sources of threat related to the market disturbances that changed the existing patterns of 
the global energy system. The main concern was related to the observation that, on the one 
hand, market-type energy relations no longer worked because they were progressively being 
substituted by both political and other kinds of unpredictable interferences in energy 
relations, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Another widely-shared feature of the 
framing of energy security was its cross-sector nature; energy was framed both in terms of 
economic, environmental, societal and political concerns, even though different actors put 
special emphasis on particular sectors. 
 
In contrast, major differences exist when it comes to the identification of the referent objects, 
that is to say, the things that are considered to be affected by threats. The participants in the 
energy security debate, in accordance with the expectations related to their institutional 
roles, emphasised different types of referent objects. Thus, in the European Commission’s 
discourse, the national perspective was almost non-existent and the focus was on protecting 
the European economy or European integration and individuals, both consumers and 
citizens. The European Parliament widened the scope of referent objects further, ranging 
from the EU citizens’ way of life to energy as a global good. Conversely, the European Council 
and particular member states put special emphasis on national energy systems and thus, 
their own competences and responsibilities to ensure their energy independence. This may 
hardly be surprising, but it reaffirms the fact that even in times of growing demand for 
cooperative governance at the EU level in the domain of energy, member states hardly 
perceive the EU as a unit of reference, and consequently do not trust the EU as the ‘most 
appropriate locus’ for dealing with energy problems. Unlike other policy domains, such as 
those in Justice and Home Affairs, where security discourses may have triggered uniting 
effects around the need to protect the EU’s common borders and a common ‘Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’, no such powerful parallel can be found in the energy domain 
at the time being. As this article has sought to demonstrate, member states have emphasised 
the unit level (state) or sub-systemic level (not the EU, but the European or Euro-Atlantic 
community of countries).  This is most clearly evident in the Polish and German proposals for 
an Energy NATO or an Energy OSCE. 
 
Secondly, this article has highlighted the fact that the discourses of those actors pursuing 
further communitarisation of energy policies might have been ineffective precisely because 
of their appeal to security. Essentially, the framing of the external dimension of the energy 
policy in terms of security or geostrategic concern rendered the pledge for a greater role for 
the Community institutions more difficult.  In this sense, we have argued that framing energy 
as a security issue contributed to a reinforcement of the discourses in favour of maintaining 
energy policies in a predominantly intergovernmental framework.  
 
Finally, we should recall that although we have argued in this article that no major moves 
towards the establishment of a Common Energy Policy and/or an EU external energy policy 
have been made, the small steps that have been taken are not to be dismissed. The most 
illustrative of these steps was the introduction of a Title on ‘Energy Policy’ in the Lisbon 
Treaty, including a solidarity energy clause.  This is a development that the Commission has 
been pursuing since 1990. In fact, it might be argued that the Commission and the 
Parliament’s securitizing moves did have: (1) a mobilizing effect on the level of support 
among the member states for the measures that had already been implemented or prepared 
and (2) an impact on raising public awareness of the Community institutions’ tasks. However, 
these gradual reforms in the field of energy could also be considered as a natural 
development through functional steps towards greater cohesion with both horizontal and 
vertical coordination of existing activities and, it could be argued, they do not constitute an 
exceptional course of action, as a more radical, successful securitization process would 
suggest. In this sense, it is important to remember that the Council already posited in 1974 




that the establishment of the then “new energy policy strategy for the Community”, implied 
“close coordination of the positions of the member states of the Community which will 
enable it progressively to express a common viewpoint on energy problems vis-à-vis the 
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